Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine

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Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine

Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine

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Dentistry, Oral & Craniofacial Sciences Navigation link in category Our faculties. Press escape key to return to main menu Using examples from a wide variety of conflicts, Lawrence Freedman shows that successful military command depends on the ability not only to use armed forces effectively but also to understand the political context in which they are operating. Command is the history of our time, told through war. It’s a wonderful, idiosyncratic feat of storytelling as well as an essential account of how the modern world’s wars have been fought, written by someone whose grasp of complex detail is as strong and effective as the clarity of his style. I shall read it again and again. Facilities Navigation link in category Research & Innovation. Press escape key to return to main menu Hello and welcome to the Rachman Review. I’m Gideon Rachman, chief foreign affairs commentator of the Financial Times. This week’s edition is about the stunning change in the war in Ukraine. The rapid advances by Ukrainian forces in the east of the country have changed the momentum of the conflict. Suddenly, Russian defeat looks like a real possibility. My guest this week is Sir Lawrence Freedman, emeritus professor of war studies at King’s College London and author of a new book, Command: The Politics of Military Operations From Korea to Ukraine. So, is this the beginning of the end of the war in Ukraine?

Of course, the other thing is the possibility of some kind of radical escalation by the Russians. And those people I’ve spoken to who are warier about writing Russia off think that Putin can’t accept defeat and that therefore he’ll do something like either mobilise or use tactical nuclear weapons or start heavily bombing civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, that things could get really quite ugly. Freedman predicts (not unlike Sabina Higgins) that eventually, the war in Ukraine will falter and stall to a deadly stalemate and ultimately to a negotiation. Unless Putin presses the nuclear button. I think the only ‘theory of victory’ the Kremlin has at the present is that the west turns on Ukraine because of the energy crisis. But the surprise there is that Moscow has not asked for a ceasefire now. That would put Zelenskiy on the spot because he couldn’t agree to one. DeGroot, Gerard (13 December 2013). " 'Strategy: A History' by Lawrence Freedman". The Washington Post . Retrieved 24 November 2014. It is clear from Freedman’s account of the command element of the Falkland campaign that the British had two immediate priorities. The first was what they termed a “moral victory” over the Argentinian junta – in other words, to simply frighten them, to terrorise and intimidate them. The second was to achieve an “operational victory” – to go ashore and defeat a demoralised enemy.

Military force had been quite good for Putin up until now. He used it effectively in Chechnya, Crimea, Georgia and Syria. He used it in quite a limited fashion in Ukraine’s Donbas region in 2014 where those doing his dirty work wanted him to take an even more aggressive approach. Even then it took until May to focus on what they could do – artillery barrages on a narrow front, a tactic for which Ukraine had no easy response, except to take heavy casualties until western weapons systems began arriving.” Freedman articulates this point best when narrating the case of US General Wesley Clark, who served in Kosovo in the late 1990s. Clark encountered ‘a decision-making tangle, involving NATO, the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia’ (p. 335). His attitudes, statements and actions alienated some, creating avoidable friction with Secretary of Defense William Cohen and the Pentagon. Here, Freedman draws on Anton Myrer's novel, Once an eagle (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2013), which he describes as having achieved a cult-like following in the US Army and in the Marines. The novel tells the story of two officers, Sam Damon and Courtney Massengale, who present two tendencies: Damon embodies a ‘mustang’ officer who does what is right for his men and the mission while remaining pragmatic, humane and likeable; and Massengale, a polished West Point graduate who remains focused on advancing his own career through networking and self-promotion. Through the novel, officers learn to disdain Massengale for being overly political. But, Freedman counters, Myrer's readers have been misled by a false dilemma. Being political may be frowned upon; but being good at politics is a different thing. And it should be embraced. In the case of General Clark, his problems did not arise so much from his similarities with Massengale, but rather from his failing to be good at politics. The greatest strength of this book is its breadth. The conflicts chosen for study are worthy, including both those familiar to western audiences and ones which are criminally underrepresented. It was interesting to learn more about some of these such as the Arab/Israeli war of 1973 and the India/Pakistan conflict. The writing style is academic yet accessible, much like Freedman’s other work meaning it’s both a good starting point and one for a military history/strategy enjoyer. Summer and Winter Programmes Navigation link in category Study. Press escape key to return to main menu

Student Services Online Navigation link in category Student Services. Press escape key to return to main menuInstead, Putin is still acting as though he expects more from this war than he has already got. Why I think there are some signs of desperation on the Russian side is that some are beginning to recognise that an energy crunch is not going to lead to a betrayal of Ukraine. In the long term, that signals the risk of deep damage to Russia’s economy.” Miles, Oliver (22 November 2009). "Oliver Miles: The key question – is Blair a war criminal?". The Independent . Retrieved 20 May 2018. Sir Lawrence David Freedman, KCMG , CBE , PC , FBA (born 1948) is a British academic, historian and author specialising in foreign policy, international relations and strategy. [1] He has been described as the "dean of British strategic studies" [2] and was a member of the Iraq Inquiry. [3] He is an Emeritus Professor of War Studies at King's College London. Contrary to Putin’s claims, Russia’s armed forces may instead be approaching a crisis point, not only as they face an increasingly challenging fight in Ukraine but because they risk the long-term degradation of their capabilities.

And have the Ukrainians surprised you? They’ve certainly surprised the Russians. They’ve turned out to be a pretty effective fighting force and appear to be becoming more effective with the passing of time, unlike the Russians. Freedman held positions at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) before he was appointed, in 1982, Professor of War Studies at King's College London. He was head of the department until 1997. In 2000, he was the first head of the college's School of Social Science and Public Policy. From 2003 to December 2013, he was a Vice Principal at King's College London. He retired from King's in December 2014. He was appointed a Fellow of the college in 1992. He was appointed a Visiting Professor at the University of Oxford in the Blavatnik School of Government in 2015. [7]According to Freedman, the Royal Navy under the command of Rear Admiral John “Sandy” Woodward was very enthusiastic about the mission – using aircraft carriers recently targeted for destruction in swingeing defence cuts. The army and Royal Air Force were less enthusiastic, with Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Beetham and Chief of Staff General Sir Edwin Bramall concerned at where the Royal Navy was bringing them – on such an extended projection of force – and “to where it all might lead”. Moral vs operational victory One issue that has intrigued Freedman, as well as other analysts, is why Putin – whose use of force had been limited in scope before Ukraine – embarked on such a dangerous and badly prepared-for gamble in Ukraine. At the heart of the problem, Freedman believes, is the rigidly hierarchical nature of the Kremlin’s decision-making and how those at the very top are immune to responsibility for mistakes.

Command and control are particularly difficult when the contrasting perspectives of air, navy and ground commanders are exacerbated by national differences in Nato or UN operations. A classic example of “too many cooks” is Kosovo 1999: the Nato campaign to stop Serbian atrocities against Kosovar Albanians. Its head was General Wesley Clark, the US supreme commander in Europe, who was answerable both to the US president and the Nato secretary-general yet had no forces directly under his control. Clark got into ferocious arguments with General Mike Short, head of the US Air Force in Europe, about the focus for the bombing campaign. Freedman, Lawrence (4 October 2018). Nuclear Deterrence. illustrated by Duncan Smith. London: Ladybird Books. ISBN 978-0-7181-8889-4. Formatting and Grammar. I do not know if I simply had a rotten apple copy of this book but what I do know is that the grammar and formatting of sentences was, in some instances, atrocious. Whole sentences were joined together without spaces and I had to do a double take of countless sentences and paragraphs because I simply could not understand the way in which they were written. Whilst it did not detract from the content of the book, it certainly made the reading experience far less enjoyable. Professional & Support Services Navigation link in category About. Press escape key to return to main menu Natural, Mathematical & Engineering Sciences Navigation link in category Our faculties. Press escape key to return to main menu

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Corn, Tony (9 September 2006). "Clausewitz in Wonderland". RealClearPolitics . Retrieved 30 March 2014.



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