Sovereignty: The Battle for the Hearts and Minds of Men

Product Information

Thomas Paine: Reinventing Popular Sovereignty in an Age of Revolutions, Carine Lounissi (University of Rouen-Normandie, France) Importantly, this quest for the democratic legitimacy of international law qua source of democratic sovereignty does not necessarily amount to an attempt at politicizing the international community qua sovereign polity or even qua sovereign global state. It may be a consequence but not a necessary one. Other forms of global or international demoi-cracy can be explored. Part of the answer comes from indirect State democracy as international democratic and human rights standards develop as minimal common standards, but direct democratic legitimation is also needed as in a federal polity. The entry provides, on the one hand, a restatement of sovereignty’s historical development, a presentation of the concept and its various conceptions, a critical explanation of its legal nature and sources, and an analysis of its current regime under international law; and, on the other, a discussion of its contentious relationship to human rights and democracy and an assessment of some of the specific difficulties it raises for international law nowadays and of how it is currently developing.

After providing a restatement of sovereignty’s historical development, a presentation of the concept, and its various conceptions, an analysis of its current legal basis and regime under international law and a discussion of two of the main contentious issues raised recently in connection with State sovereignty, a concluding assessment of some of the specific difficulties it raises for international law nowadays and of how it is currently developing may be useful. To understand how this internationalization of modern sovereignty finally came about, it is useful to distinguish two key developments: the internationalization of popular sovereignty, and the development of sovereignty beyond the State. Chapter 6: Indigenous Self-Determination and Data Governance in the Canadian Policy Context, Robyn K. Rowe, Julie R. Bull and Jennifer D. Walker Divided Sovereignty: Polybius and the Compound Constitution, Jed W. Atkins (Duke University, USA) and Carl E. Young (Hillsdale College, USA) He had another statement that said the following: “Will you choose to be free to do what you feel like doing at risk of the bondage that comes in the end? Or do you want to subject yourself to the discipline required now to achieve ultimate and lasting freedom?”By contrast, numerous variations of the principle and so-called ‘correlated’ principles of sovereignty, as opposed to the principle of sovereignty itself, can be found in conventional international law. This is the case in particular of Art. 2 (1) UN Charter for the principle of sovereign equality, but also in the Friendly Relations Declaration (1970) for the detailed rights that follow from that principle of sovereign equality. The UN Charter also protects sovereign States’ domaine réservé and prohibits other States’ intervention on sovereign States’ territory (Arts 2 (4) and (7) UN Charter). Further correlated principles to the principle of sovereign equality may be found in general principles of international law and customary international law, and have been progressively recognized in international adjudication. Have a book that you’d like for me to read? Be sure to comment down below and read and review it so long as it has to do with mental strength or success. My only critique in this category is that some sections felt repetitive, only worded slightly different. In addition, there were two spelling errors! Ughh. WG Werner and JH de Wilde ‘The Endurance of Sovereignty’ (2001) 7 European Journal of International Relations 283–313.

H Kelsen Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts. Beitrag zu einer reinen Rechtslehre (Mohr Tübingen 1920) 204–05, 251–53. As presented before, sovereignty is alternatively or cumulatively referred to as ultimate power and supreme authority. Externally, it implies a degree of independence or freedom. As a legal regime or status, international sovereignty, and more particularly international external sovereignty entails the rights that can guarantee sovereign independence, but also the duties that correspond to those rights in a community of equal sovereigns where all rights are reciprocal. Secondly, however, with respect to further international human rights, States may not commit to more than their constituency could and what that right to have rights or self-government authorizes. When the international legal norms at stake pertain to the basic rules of political legitimacy at the domestic level and to the details of human rights protection, both international sovereignty and international human rights law have met their intrinsic limitations. Deciding on what makes us members of a political community and how to protect our equal rights as such is likely to be the last issue to leave the scope of collective self-government and hence of sovereignty. Hence, for instance, the application of principles such as the State margin of appreciation or proportionality in international human rights adjudication. The biggest contradiction of all is that, on the one hand, he argues that the future lies with the nation state and the sense of rootedness in place that makes democratic engagement possible. Fair enough – except that, on the other hand, he ends up suggesting that place doesn’t really matter anymore: “Geography comes before history. But for centuries we have been loosening the bonds of time and distance. Place has become less important.” If that is so, how can the old idea of pure sovereignty not need to be rethought?Unlikely Re-Emergence of the Territorial Nation-State,’ Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 11(3): D Held ‘The Changing Structure of International Law: Sovereignty Transformed?’ in D Held and AG McGrew (eds), The Global Transformations Reader (2 nd ed Polity Press Cambridge 2003) 162–76.

Those three phenomena, ie delegation of sovereign powers to IOs, international law’s internal subject matters and its relative normativity, have at first been interpreted as restrictions on both internal and external sovereignty. In an increasing number of cases, international law seems to be limiting States’ sovereignty without their consent; sovereignty is therefore limited but no longer only in a self-limiting fashion. Sovereignty is often said, as a result, to have been circumscribed and tamed or even relinquished in the second half of the century. The contradictions multiply. Tombs is deeply committed to the two central and intertwined propositions that have propelled Britain towards its deeply uncertain fate as a semi-detached adjunct to that continent. The first is that sovereignty is an absolute concept; it “can be given up, but not shared”. The second is that “there was only one meaningful Brexit, which was to leave the Single Market, the Customs Union and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice”.

Subcategories

L Henkin ‘That “s” Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, et cetera’ (1999) 68 FordhamLR 1–14. It follows therefore that legal and political sovereignty, even though they are conceptually distinct and can exist separately in some cases, are not logically separable in the long run. This also implies that when they are both granted, neither of them can be given priority over the other. This does not, however, imply that they should be regarded as identical as on a Kelsenian model; they have a conceptually distinct nature and content. There is, in other words, an imperfect logical relationship between the two forms of sovereignty. Secondly, material and economic interdependence between States has meant increased institutional cooperation at a transnational, international, and supranational level, and the creation of corresponding IOs. The delegation of sovereign competences to IOs is compatible with the sovereignty of Member States and does not turn IOs into sovereign States (see Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations [Advisory Opinion]). These considerations about the role of sovereign States and IOs as international law-makers have important normative consequences. States and IOs do not make international law for themselves as free rational agents, but as officials for their respective populations, other States, and IOs. Their role as officials constrains their competence not only in terms of internal accountability, but at the international level itself. States are bound by the rule of international law, ie the set of values and principles associated with the idea of international legality. In the last resort, sovereign States are not the bearers of ultimate value. They exist for the sake of a people. In the international context, States are recognized by international law as trustees for the people committed to their care. This, of course, becomes clear from international human rights law, but it is also the point of most norms of international law: ultimately, international law is oriented to the well-being of human individuals, rather than to the freedom or autonomy of States.